In this paper we model and explain US macroeconomic outcomes subject to the discipline that monetary policy is set optimally. Exploiting the restrictions that come from optimal policymaking, we estimate the parameters in the Federal Reserve's policy objective function together with the parameters in its optimization constraints. For the period following Volcker's appointment as chairman, we estimate the implicit inflation target to be around 1.4% and show that policymakers assigned a significant weight to interest rate smoothing. We show that the estimated optimal policy provides a good description of US data for the 1980s and 1990s.
The Policy Preferences of the US Federal Reserve 1 Introduction
This paper uses economic outcomes and macroeconomic behavior to estimate the policy objective function and the implicit inflation target for the US Federal Reserve.
Under the assumption that the Federal Reserve sets monetary policy optimally, the parameters in the objective function, which indicate how different goals are traded-off in response to shocks, are estimated together with the implicit inflation target and the parameters in the optimization constraints.
Ever since Taylor (1993) showed that a simple three parameter rule provided a good description of short-term interest rate movements in the US, it has become common practice to use estimated policy rules to summarize monetary policy behavior (Clarida et al., 2000) . One reason why using estimated rules to describe monetary policy behavior is attractive is that estimated rules capture the systematic relationship between interest rates and macroeconomic variables and, as such, they can be viewed as approximations to central bank decision rules. However, while estimated policy rules can usefully summarize fluctuations in interest rates, their main drawback is that they are unable to address questions about the policy formulation process. This drawback is evident in the fact that the feedback coefficients in estimated rules do not have a structural interpretation and that they do not identify key policy parameters, such as the implicit inflation target.
Alongside the literature that estimates monetary policy rules there is an extensive literature that analyzes optimal monetary policy. 1 While optimal policy rules are attractive because the policymaker's objective function is explicit, the resulting rules often conflict with estimated policy rules because they imply that policymakers should be very aggressive in response to macroeconomic shocks, but these aggressive responses cannot be found in the data. Consequently, when it comes to describing how interest rates move over time, optimal policy rules do not perform well. Of course, the key reason why optimal policies fail to adequately explain interest rate movements is that the policy objective function is invariably parameterized without reference to the data.
Given the strengths and weaknesses of estimated rules and optimal rules it is nat-ural to combine the two approaches to obtain an optimal rule that is also compatible with observed data. In fact, there are many advantages to being able to describe monetary policy behavior at the level of policy objectives and not just at the level of policy rules. One advantage is that it becomes possible to assess whether observed economic outcomes can be reconciled and accounted for within an optimal policy framework. Two further advantages are that it facilitates formal tests of whether the objective function has changed over time and that it allows key parameters, such as the implicit inflation target, to be estimated. Furthermore, estimating the objec-
tive function reveals what the policy objectives must be if conventionally estimated rules are the outcome of optimal behavior. This paper assumes that US monetary policy is set optimally and estimates the policy objective function for the Federal Reserve. With the Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) model providing the optimization constraints, we estimate the parameters in the constraints and the parameters in the policy objective function that best conform to the data. Of course, trying to explain US macroeconomic outcomes within the confines of an optimal policy framework offers a number of challenges. Even if the analysis is limited to after the mid-1960s, one must contend with the run-up in inflation that occurred in the 1970s, the disinflation in the 1980s, several large oil price shocks, the Kuwait war, and the recessions that occurred in the early 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, a central message that emerges from estimated policy rules is that while the 1980s and 1990s can be characterized in terms of rules that are empirically stable and that satisfy the Taylor principle, 2 the 1970s cannot (Clarida et al., 2000) .
Instead, when analyzed in the context of standard macro-policy models, policy rules estimated for the 1970s typically produce instability (in backward-looking models)
or indeterminacy (in forward-looking models). In effect, these rules explain the rise in inflation that occurred during the 1970s either in terms of the economy being on an explosive path, which is incompatible with optimal policymaking, or in terms of sun-spots and self-fulfilling expectations.
Because of these difficulties, although we present estimates for data prior to the Volcker disinflation, simply in order to see how the 1960s and 1970s can be best de-scribed in terms of optimal policymaking, we largely focus on the 1980s and 1990s.
For the period following Volcker's appointment to Federal Reserve chairman we investigate how -or even whether -the Volcker-Greenspan period can be characterized in terms of optimal policymaking. We find that the parameters in the policy objective function that best fit the data differ in important ways from the values usually assumed in studies that analyze optimal monetary policy. In particular, we do not find the output gap to be a significant variable in the Federal Reserve's objective function, which suggests that the output gap enters estimated policy rules because of its implications for future inflation, rather than because it is a target variable itself.
In addition, we find that describing the data in terms of optimal policymaking requires a much larger weight on interest rate smoothing than is commonly entertained, but that this is not a product of serially correlated policy shocks (c.f. Rudebusch, 2002 Ozlale (2003) .
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the following Section we introduce the model that is used to represent the constraints on the Federal Reserve's optimization problem and present initial estimates of these constraints. The policy objective function that we estimate is introduced and motivated in Section 3. Section 3 also describes how the optimal policy problem is solved and how the model, with the cross-equation restrictions arising from optimal policymaking imposed, is estimated.
Section 4 compares our study to others in the literature. Section 5 discusses the estimation results and compares them to estimated policy rules and to the estimates in other studies. Section 6 presents looks at the pre-Volcker period and contrasts that period to the Volcker-Greenspan period. Section 7 concludes.
The Policy Constraints
When central banks optimize they do so subject to constraints dictated by the behavior of other agents in the economy. How well these constraints explain economic behavior is important if useful estimates of the policy preference parameters are to be obtained. In this paper the economy is described using the model developed in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999 
where y t is the output gap, π t is annualized quarterly inflation, and i t is the annualized quarterly federal funds rate. From these variables, annual inflation, π a t = ) × 100, where Y t is real GDP and Y p t is the Congregational Budget Office measure of potential output, and π t = log(
where P t is the GDP chain-weighted price index. The error terms g t and v t are interpreted as demand shocks and supply shocks, respectively.
To illustrate the basic characteristics of the model, we estimate equations (1) - (2) using SUR, which allows for the possibility that the demand and supply shocks may (1) and (2) are estimated conditional on the federal funds rate; in Section 4 we estimate these constraints jointly with an (optimization-based) equation for the federal funds rate. Baseline estimates of equations (1) and (2) are shown in Table 1 . 3 Optimal Policy and Model Estimation
The Policy Objective Function
The policy objective function that we estimate takes the standard form
where 0 < β < 1, λ, ν ≥ 0, and E t is the mathematical expectations operator condi- and Svensson (1997) shows that equation (3) captures the ideas that motivate inflation targeting. Finally, Woodford (2002) shows that objectives functions similar to equation (3) can be derived as a quadratic approximation to a representative agent's discounted intertemporal utility function.
In addition to inflation and output stabilization goals, equation (3) assets and liabilities (Cukierman, 1989) ; monetary policy's influence comes through long-term interest rates and persistent movements in short-term interest rates are required to generate the necessary movements in long-term rates (Goodfriend, 1991) ; smoothing interest rates mimics the inertia that is optimal under precommitment (Woodford, 1999) ; large movements in interest rates can lead to lost reputation, or credibility, if a policy intervention subsequently needs to be reversed; and, parameter uncertainty makes it optimal for policymakers to be cautious when changing interest rates (Brainard, 1967 ). An alternative explanation, based on political economy considerations, is that it is useful to allow some inflation (or disinflation) to occur following shocks because this provides an ex post verifiable reason for policy interventions. Accordingly, policymaker's make interventions that appear smaller than optimal, allowing greater movements in inflation than they might otherwise have, to ensure that they have sufficient grounds to defend their intervention (Goodhart, 1997 ).
To illustrate the separation that exists between conventional optimal policy rules and estimated policy rules, we solve for an optimal simple forward-looking Taylor- type rule and compare it to the equivalent rule estimated over 1982.Q1 -2000.Q2.
Taking equation (3) as the policy objective function, and setting λ = 1, ν = 0.25, and β = 0.99, the optimal simple Taylor-type rule is 4
The equivalent empirical specification is 5 (standard errors in parentheses)
There are important differences between equations (4) and (5). In particular, the coefficients on expected future inflation and on the output gap are much bigger in the optimal policy rule than they are in the estimated policy rule. Conversely, the coefficient on the lagged interest rate is around 0.81 in the estimated policy, but only around 0.17 in the optimal policy rule. While some of the differences between equations (4) and (5) may be due to the fact that equation (5) is estimated, it remains clear that the objective function parameters used to generate this optimal policy rule -which are typical of the values considered in the literature on optimal policy rules -do not reproduce the gradual, but sustained, policy responses that are implied by the estimated policy rule.
State-Space Form and Optimal Policy
To solve for optimal policy rules we first put the optimization constraints in the state-space form
where
is the state vector,
is the shock vector, which has variancecovariance matrix Σ, and x t = i t is the policy instrument, or control variable.
For equations (1) and (2), the matrices in the state-space form are
To solve for this optimal simple Taylor-type rule, the optimization constraints are expressed in terms of deviations-from-means and, without loss of generality, the inflation target, π * , is normalized to equal zero.
5 Equation (5) is estimated using instrumental variables, with the predetermined variables in equations (1) and (2) serving as instruments. 
Next we require that the objective function
be written in terms of the state and control vectors as
where W, Q, H, and G are matrices containing the policy preference parameters and x and z are the implicit targets for the vectors x t and z t , respectively. Notice that the target vectors (x and z) are not necessarily independent of each other; from equation (6) they must satisfy C + Az + Bx − z = 0 to be feasible.
To write equation (7) in terms of equation (8), we first note that the interest rate smoothing component ν (i t − i t−1 ) 2 can be expanded into the three terms ν(i 2 t − 2i t i t−1 + i 2 t−1 ). The first of these three terms represents a penalty on the policy instrument; it is accommodated by setting Q = [ν]. The second term implies a penalty on the interaction between a state variable and the policy instrument. inflation, the second element is the output gap, and the third element is the lagged federal funds rate. The weights on annual inflation, the output gap, and the lagged federal funds rate are unity, λ, and ν, respectively. Thus, W = P ′ RP, where
Following Sargent (1987) , for this stochastic linear optimal regulator problem the optimal policy rule is x t = f + Fz t , where
Equations (9) - (11) can be solved by substituting equation (10) into equation (11) and then iterating the resulting matrix Riccati equation to convergence, thereby obtaining a solution for M. Once a solution for M has been found, F and f can be determined recursively. Alternatively, F and M can be solved jointly using a method like Gauss-Seidel, with the constant vector f then determined recursively.
When subject to control, the state variables evolve according to
and the system is stable provided the spectral radius of A + BF is less than unity.
Notice that the stability condition depends on F, but not f , which implies that Q, H, G, and W, but not z or x, influence the system's stability properties.
Estimating the System
As shown above, for given values of a 0 − a 3 , b 0 − b 4 , λ, ν, and π * , which are the parameters to be estimated, the system can be written as
Having obtained the solution to the optimal policy problem, we express the solution in structural form by writing the model equations as
Now defining y t = π t y t i t
which is an over-identified structural VAR(4) model.
Let Ψ denote the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance vector, ǫ t , and
and A 4 are each functions of θ. The subjective discount factor, β, is set to its conventional value of 0.99, but the sensitivity of the estimates to different values of β is examined (see Section 5.2).
The joint probability density function (PDF) for the data is
where T is the sample size, including initial conditions. Now we postulate that ǫ t |{y j } t 1 ∼ N(0, Ψ) for all t, then, from equation (18), the joint PDF for {y t } T 1 can be expressed as
where n equals the number of stochastic endogenous variables, i.e., three. We assume that the initial conditions {y t } 4 1 are fixed and thus that P {y t } 4 1 ; θ, Ψ is a proportionality constant. From this joint PDF the following quasi-loglikelihood function is
The QMLE of Ψ is
which can be used to concentrate the quasi-loglikelihood function, giving
In the following Section we estimate θ by maximizing equation (20) , and then use equation (19) to recover an estimate of Ψ. As the problem currently stands, however, Ψ is not invertable because there are three variables in y t , but only two shocks in ǫ t . Consequently, ln |Ψ| = −∞ and ln L c θ; {y t } T 1 = ∞ for all θ, and the model parameters cannot be estimated. This singularity is a standard hurdle for estimation problems involving optimal decision rules. Following Hansen and Sargent (1980) , the approach we take is to assume that the econometrician has less information than the policymaker and that, therefore, the decision rule that the econometrician estimates omits some variables. These omitted variables are captured through a disturbance term, ω t , which is appended to equation (17) when the model is estimated. This disturbance term, which we will refer to as the policy shock (for lack of a better name), eliminates the singularity in Ψ, allowing estimation to proceed.
To test the significance of the estimated parameters, the variance-covariance matrix for θ is constructed using
is the inverse of the Fisher-Information matrix and
is the outer-product variance estimator; both H(θ) and G(θ) are evaluated at θ. Equation (21) is the quasimaximum-likelihood estimator for the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates (White, 1982) .
Related Work
Having described the model, the policy objective function, and the approach used to estimate the system, it is useful to consider how the exercise undertaken here relates to work by Salemi (1995) he employs a two-step method to estimate the model. First the parameters in the optimization constraints are estimated, then, conditional upon the estimated constraints, the policy regime parameters are estimated. Ozlale's two-step estimation approach differs importantly from the approach we take, which estimates all of the 6 Relative to equation (2), they set b0 = b3 = 0 and b2 = 1 − b1, excluding the intercept and allowing only two lags of inflation to enter the Phillips curve, and they include (one period lagged) the annual change in commodity prices. On the demand side (equation 1), they allow the second and third lag of the real interest rate to affect the gap and replace the annual average federal funds rate with the quarterly average federal funds rate. parameters in the model jointly and uses robust standard errors to conduct inference.
There are also differences in focus between these studies and ours. Favero By way of contrast, in addition to testing for a policy regime break at the time Volcker was appointed chairman, our study explores the sensitivity of the policy regime estimates to model misspecification, relates the resulting decision rules to estimated policy rules, and examines whether optimal policymaking is an assumption that can be rejected by the data. We also interpret our results in light of the wider literature on inflation targeting.
Estimation Results
In this Section we apply the estimation approach developed in Section 3 to estimate jointly the parameters in equations (1), (2), and (3). The sample period begins in 1982.Q1 and ends in 2000.Q2, a period we will refer to as the Volcker-Greenspan period. We begin the sample in 1982.Q1 to exclude the period when first nonborrowed reserves and then total reserves were targeted. 7 We are interested in examining whether economic outcomes during the Volcker-Greenspan period can be explained within an optimal policy framework, and what the policy objective function parameters are that best explain US macroeconomic data. We are also interested in estimating the implicit inflation target that enters the policy objective function.
The results are shown in Table 2 . The parameter estimates in the optimization constraints are precisely estimated and they have the conventional signs. Relative to the full sample estimates in Table   1 , although the sample period is shorter here, it is clear that the cross-equation restrictions that stem from optimal policymaking greatly improve the efficiency with which the parameters in the constraints are estimated. 
argue that a small, or zero, value for λ is necessary to match the low volatility in inflation and the high volatility in output that are observed in US data. Dennis Importantly, the estimates that we obtain quantify -in terms of policy objectivesthe interest rate smoothing that takes place, which allows the importance that the Federal Reserve places on interest rate smoothing to be assessed relative to other goals. Before leaving this sub-section, it is interesting to test whether monetary policy was set optimally during the Volcker-Greenspan period. To perform this test, we estimate equations (1) and (2) 
where, σ ω = 0.589. For this three-equation system in which the coefficients in the policy rule are unrestricted, the value for the loglikelihood function is −190.587.
The structure of the output gap and inflation equations are the same and there are ten freely estimated parameters in equation (22), but only three freely estimated parameters, λ, ν, and π * , in the optimal policy model, so optimal policymaking implies seven restrictions on the unrestricted policy rule (equation, 22) . A likelihood ratio test can reject the null hypothesis that monetary policy was set optimally over this period at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level.
To put this result in context, if we constrain the parameters in equation (22) 
When monetary policy is restricted to follow a Talyor-type rule, the value of the loglikelihood function is −201.885, which implies that the null hypothesis that monetary policy was set according to this Taylor-type rule can be rejected using a likelihood ratio test at both the 5% level and the 1% level. Interestingly, while it does not constitute a formal hypothesis test (because the models are non-nested) the loglikelihood function is higher when policy is set optimally than when policy is set according to the outcome-based Taylor-type rule (equation, 23).
Serially Independent Policy Shocks
While the results above suggest that the Federal Reserve does smooth interest rates, it is possible that the persistence in the federal funds rate is actually an illusion caused by serially correlated shocks to the policy rule (Rudebusch, 2002) . The basic argument in Rudebusch (2002) is that when policy rules are freely estimated, rules with lagged dependent variables and rules with serially correlated shocks are statistically difficult to disentangle using direct testing methods. For this reason, it is possible that the lagged interest rates that typically enter estimated policy rules simply soak up persistence introduced by serially correlated policy shocks.
When monetary policy is set optimally, however, the variables that enter the policy rule are determined by the system's state vector. Consequently, the lagged interest rate variables in the state vector enter the optimal rule because they help policymakers forecast output and inflation. Because they are part of the state vector these lagged interest rates would enter the optimal policy rule even if ν = 0.
Thus, testing whether lagged interest rates are significant in the policy rule does not necessarily amount to a test for interest rate smoothing. But, when monetary policy is set optimally, additional structure is introduced that facilitates a direct test between interest rate smoothing (ν > 0) and serially correlated shocks.
While Figure 1 does not suggest that the monetary policy shocks are serially correlated, to formally test whether serially correlated policy shocks are spuriously making ν significant we re-estimate the system allowing ω t to follow an AR(1) process, i.e., ω t = ρω t−1 + η t , |ρ| < 1, and modify the quasi-loglikelihood function accordingly.
The quasi-loglikelihood function becomes
where ς t = v t g t η t Table 3 . The most notable aspect of Table 3 is that ρ, the autocorrelation coefficient in the policy shock process, is not significantly different from zero. Moreover, allowing for serially correlated policy shocks does not alter the other parameter estimates and the estimate of ν, while falling slightly, remains significant; λ is still insignificantly different from zero. These results show that the fact that ν is significant is not due to serially correlated policy shocks.
Sensitivity to the Discount Factor
We now examine how the policy regime estimates change as the discount factor, β, is varied. Here we re-estimate the model while varying β between 0.95 and 1.00, the plausible range for quarterly data. As before, the sample period is 1982.Q1 - Table 4 ; standard errors are in parentheses. Table 4 shows that qualitatively the results are not sensitive to the assumed value for β. In each case the weight on output gap stabilization is insignificant and the weight on interest rate smoothing is significant. The inflation target varies between 1.33% and 1.56%. Interestingly, as β falls the estimates of λ and ν both decline, while the estimate of π * rises. Greater discounting leads to policymakers having less concern for the future and for the economic implications of their policy interventions.
2000.Q2. Results are shown in
In turn, less concern for the future is associated with a smaller interest rate smoothing parameter because the policymaker's lack of concern for the future means that they have less need to make large policy interventions to offset shocks.
Optimal Policy Estimates and Estimated Policy Rules
In this Section, we examine how the estimated optimal-policy model responds to demand and supply shocks. In particular, we compare the impulse responses that are generated using the estimated optimal policy preferences in Table 2 to a benchmark model and to impulse responses generated using the policy preferences estimated in For this exercise, the benchmark model consists of equations (1), (2), and the outcome-based Taylor-type rule, equation (23) , that was estimated jointly using maximum-likelihood over 1982.Q1 -2000.Q2 in Section 5. This benchmark model -with monetary policy set according to a Taylor-type rule -is used to generate baseline impulse responses showing how output, inflation, and the federal funds rate respond to unit demand and supply shocks, and to generate 95% confidence bands for these impulse responses. 8 Then we take the policy preferences estimated in Table   2 , in Favero and Rovelli (2003) , and in Ozlale (2003) , solve for their corresponding optimal policy rules, and use these rules to construct impulse response functions for output, inflation, and the federal funds rate. The impulses for the different policy preferences and those for the benchmark model and their 95% confidence bands are shown in Figure 2 . 8 The 95% confidence bands were generated using 50,000 simulations. Turning to the impulse response functions generated when Favero and Rovelli's policy preferences are used, Figure 2 demonstrates that these responses are very different to those that come from our estimates and from Ozlale's estimates. More importantly, Favero and Rovelli's policy preferences produce large swings in the interest rate and the output gap in response to demand and supply shocks.
Given that all three sets of estimates are based on a similar model for the optimization constraints and on the same specification for the policy objective function, it is useful to consider why the policy preference estimates are so different. One reason is that they use different sample periods to estimate λ and ν. to more than one appears to be a consequence of this different output gap variable.
Another area where the studies differ is the value assumed for the discount factor. Ozlale (2003) assumes that β = 1 whereas our baseline estimates assume that β = 0.99. However, even if we set β = 1 the estimates that we obtain are still very different to Ozlale's (see Table 4 ). Favero and Rovelli (2003) , on the other hand, assume that the Federal Reserve only looks four quarters ahead, and that these four quarters are discounted with β = 0.975. Truncating the policy horizon in the objective function, which Favero and Rovelli must do to implement their GMM estimator, may account for the very small estimates of λ and ν that they obtain. Finally, an important difference between Ozlale's estimation approach and the approach we take is that Ozlale (2003) estimates the optimization constraints and then conditions on these estimates when estimating λ and ν for the Volcker-Greenspan period. In contrast, we estimate the constraints and the policy regime parameters jointly, along with their standard errors.
A Look at the Pre-Volcker Period
In this Section we re-estimate the optimal policy model, but this time over 1966.Q1 -1979.Q3. The estimation period begins in 1966.Q1, because only after 1966.Q1 did the federal funds rate trade consistently above the discount rate. Thus, prior to 1966.Q1 it seems implausible to assume that the federal funds rate was the policy instrument (Fuhrer, 2000) . The sustained rise in inflation that occurred in the 1970s makes it a difficult period to analyze within an optimal policy framework. However, estimating the model over this period gives us a consistent framework within which to compare the pre-Volcker period to the Volcker-Greenspan period. Moreover, it allows us to quantify how economic outcomes during the pre-Volcker period can be best explained within the confines of an optimal policy environment. The model estimates are shown in Table 5 . For the pre-Volcker period the parameter estimates are clearly less precisely estimated than they are for the Volcker-Greenspan period, largely due to the shorter sample length, but the key characteristics of the Rudebusch-Svensson model come through. Over the pre-Volcker period, the neutral real interest rate is estimated to be 0.74% and the implicit inflation target is estimated to be 6.96%. However, the estimates of the policy preference parameters are not significantly different from zero.
Their insignificance suggests that the policy preference parameters are only weakly identified, which may simply be due to the sample's short length, or it may indicate that the policy regime was not stable. The latter could be the case because the sample period spans three Federal Reserve chairmen. 11 For this reason, the policy regime estimated in Table 5 is perhaps best viewed as the "average" regime in operation over the period. The estimates in Table 5 show, however, that to interpret the pre-Volcker period in terms of an optimal policy regime requires a large implicit inflation target, with the sustained deviations from this implicit inflation target ascribed to a strong preference for interest rate smoothing.
Comparing the estimates in Table 5 with those in Table 2 , it is clear that the residual standard errors for all three equations are much smaller for the Volcker-Greenspan period than they are for the pre-Volcker period. The fact that the volatility of the shocks impacting the economy have declined in the 1980s and 1990s relative to the 1960s and 1970s is discussed in Sims (1999) . Turning to the policy preference parameters, the estimates suggest that policymakers were much more likely to smooth in-terest rates (adjusting policy in small increments) during the pre-Volcker period than subsequently, but that the relative weight on output stabilization has not changed much over time.
A useful way to illustrate the differences between the pre-Volcker regime and the Volcker-Greenspan regime is through impulse response functions. 12 In Figure 3 unit demand and supply shocks are applied to the model and the resulting dynamics are shown for both policy regimes. Panels A and C correspond to the pre-Volcker period, complementing Panels B and D, which relate to the Volcker-Greenspan period.
Results for supply shocks are shown in Panels A and B; Panels C and D present the responses for the demand shock.
Considering the 1% supply shock first, the greatest difference between the two regimes is apparent in how interest rates respond to the shock. For the VolckerGreenspan regime policymakers raise the federal funds rate more quickly, and by more, than they do for the pre-Volcker regime. The outcome of this more aggressive policy intervention is that output falls more under the Volcker-Greenspan regime than it does under the pre-Volcker regime and, consequently, as inflation returns to target, the average deviation between π t and π * is smaller. Under both regimes the real interest rate actually falls when the supply shock occurs, leading to a small boost in output relative to potential. Over the longer run, however, policymakers raise the nominal interest rate by more than the increase in inflation, the real interest rate rises, which damps demand pressure and causes inflation to return to target. respond to the demand shock far more aggressively under the Volcker-Greenspan regime than they do under the pre-Volcker regime. For a 1% demand shock, the federal funds rate is raised as much as 160 basis points under the Volcker-Greenspan regime, but only about 100 basis points under the pre-Volcker regime. Moreover, under the Volcker-Greenspan regime the federal funds rate is raised much more quickly in response to the shock. Because policymakers respond to the demand shock by tightening policy more quickly and more aggressively, inflation responds less, staying closer to target (see also Boivin and Giannoni, 2003 
Conclusion
In this paper we estimated the policy objective function for the Federal Reserve from 1966 onward using a popular data-consistent macroeconometric model to describe movements in output and inflation. To estimate the policy regime we assumed that monetary policy was determined as the solution to a constrained optimization problem. The solution to this constrained optimization problem determines the decision rule, or optimal policy rule, that the Federal Reserve uses to set the federal funds rate. With interest rates set optimally, the estimation process then involved backing out from the way macroeconomic variables evolve over time, and relative to each other, the objective function parameters and the parameters in the optimization constraints that best describe the data. This approach avoids the need to estimate an unconstrained reduced form policy rule, which is advantageous because reduced form policy rules are subject to the Lucas critique.
On the basis that US monetary policy is set optimally, and that the Federal
Reserve's policy objective functions is within the quadratic class, we use likelihood methods to estimate jointly the parameters in the optimization constraints and the policy regime parameters, including the implicit inflation target. Focusing on the Volcker-Greenspan period, we estimate the implicit inflation target to be around 1.4%
and find that the Federal Reserve placed a large and statistically significant weight on interest rate smoothing, providing further evidence that central bank's, like the Federal Reserve, dislike making large changes in nominal interest rates. Allowing for serially correlated policy shocks did not affect the magnitude or the significance of the interest rate smoothing term. In line with other analyses, we did not find the output gap to be a statistically significant term in the Federal Reserve's policy objective function. For the pre-Volcker period the weight on interest rate smoothing is numerically large, but not statistically significant, possibly because the pre-Volcker period may not be a single policy regime. The implicit inflation target is estimated to be around 7%, and again the weight on output stabilization was not statistically significant.
There are a number of areas where the analysis in this paper could be usefully extended. For the pre-Volcker period, the rise in inflation that occurred during the 1970s makes the assumption that the implicit inflation target was constant difficult to mesh with the data. An alternative would be model the pre-Volcker period while allowing the inflation target to evolve according to some stochastic process. It would also be interesting to allow for real-time policymaking. In particular, in light of the issues raised in Orphanides (2001) , it would be interesting to investigate whether the results change in any material way if we restrict policy decisions to be based only on information available when policy decisions were made. However, tackling the issue of real-time data in a dynamic model, and estimating the model using systemsmethods, is non-trivial. A third important extension would be to allow private agents to be forward-looking. When private agents are forward-looking the issue of time-inconsistency arises and must be allowed for, which complicates the estimation problem. See Söderlind (1999), Salemi (2001) , and Dennis, (2004b) for three different approaches to estimating policy preferences using forward-looking models.
